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Summary 
There has been talk of a «regional Europe», and the concept has been used without inhibition when it has
been a question of describing European development. But, what does the concept really mean? Is it a
Europe with regions where regions are state controlled instruments, or  a Europe of regions on a level with a
Europe of nation-states. Or is the concept both of these things? The different theories concerned with the
question can be classified according to whether they are idealistic or realistic/pragmatic. Central to their
analyses is the new role played by the national states in a Europe coming closer together, and where the
European Union is a supra-national unit. But the European Union is also a supra-regional construction, and
this means that the regions must be allocated a position on the European political arena. The shared laws
behind the European Union are steadily granting greater legitimacy to regional power. European
Commissioners may also seek to by-pass national governments, and deal directly with regions. In
consequence, Euro-federalists tend to support an increased role for the Commission and its corollary «A
Europe of Regions», while anti-federalists and cynics argue that what is really being proposed is that region
authorities should become the agents of Brussels, i.e. «A Europe with Regions».
The Regions form the background for the post-modern position. Postmodernity places a strong emphasis on
«difference» and cultural manifold. The manifold in types of community has the effect of strengthening the
move towards European regionalisation and the building of regions. Regionalism is strengthened, while state
nationalism connected to the modern is weakened. A model for a «regional Europe» is a Europe of and with
regions, consisting of functional regions side by side with national actors and other actors. Such a Europe
has been called «multi-perspectival», «multi-layered» and «multi-leveled».
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Preface
The term region relates to a geographical area. It also implies a division of governance between state and
local authorities. In this report I outline the concept of region and the driving forces behind the regionalisation
process in Europe. The widespread and unrestricted appeal to the regional dimension has led to somewhat
lax adoption of the concept of the concept of «Europe of Regions» by the media and some sectors of
literature. In the report I present an analysis away from the “Europe of regions”, and towards a more
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differentiated appraisal of the realities of the “New Europe”. A paper version was presented at the Alpen-
Adria-Symposium held in Graz, Austria, in 1997.
Introduction
«Regional Europe» has become a steadily more familiar concept when it comes to describing and analysing
the development of  Europe. (Veggeland 1994) It has been used quite without inhibition in the description of
all types of activity which involve sub-national geographical units. But what is actually described? Does such
a Europe exist? Do the regions play a more important role than was the case a decade earlier? Are the
national states in the process of abdicating their place to the regions?
Besides, is the question a Europe of Regions or a Europe with Regions? The question concerns different
models for «competence» sharing and self-government structures. It is a fundamental question, because it
shows that the European regions can have two principally different functions: As realities existing within a
constitutionally formed political system based on federal principles. Or, participating in a hierarchical and
monopolistic state-controlled political system. In consequence, Euro-federalists tend to support the first
concept, while anti-federalists and cynics argue that regional authorities should remain the agents of
Brussels and nation-state authorities.
In a Europe of regions, the regions will be real actors with power and exert an influence on development.
The European Commissioners should by-pass national governments, and deal directly with the regions. In a
Europe with regions on the other hand, the national states will form a partnership with them, and yet retain
their dominance and monopolistic position in the different political arenas. In the first case the regional power
and influence will constitute what in judicial studies is called a “horizontal order” of laws, rules and
institutions. Opsahl (1981) suggests that treaties and agreements made on an institutional base at the
regional level can have the effect of decentralising, or constituting a horizontal order, in opposition to
national law which creates a vertical order to regulate the hierarchy.
In a Europe with regions, national law will apply in a manner such that the national states will be the main
actors and the regions will be participants in a vertical order i.e. a state hierarchy. Regions can
correspondingly be political actors in two ways. Either in a social system based on a horizontal order, or in a
system based on a vertical order. The one position doesn’t exclude the other. One result of the process of
decentralisation is that some EU member states now have a constitutionally prescribed federal structure of
regional government (such as Germany, Belgium and Austria). Others, like the Scandinavian countries, have
a politically prescribed system of regional government, but quite close to a devolved system in which local
government is empowered to undertake any task which has not been specially prohibited from undertaking
by statute, or which has not been delegated to another council. A third group of national states, including the
United Kingdom, has regional government empowered to carry out activities specifically assigned to it by
Parliament - all other activities being ultra vires. This in contrast to local government elsewhere in Europe,
where the «power of general competence» obtains.
A central question is then if a horizontal regional order is compatible with a supra-national European Union,
or if the European Union is a territorial extension of the national state’s monopolistic role as it furthers the
vertical system? As we shall see, the European Union with its institutions is less ambiguous than the
national states when it is a matter of emphasising both the horizontal and vertical order. This can be
accounted for, as Opsahl (1981) has pointed out by Community Law which the European Union builds upon
and which is a new and uniquely specified system of law. Not like International Law, which is basically built
on the inter-state level, and not like National Laws which are based upon state authority. It applies not just to
states and not just  within a state.
Community Law has its origins in the treaties and the sets of rules which it develops from these treaties.
Institutional decision making is built upon a uniform system of overarching and subordinate rules, where the
treaties are the highest level of judicial authority. According to Opsahl (1981) the important thing here is that
the Community doesn’t itself possess the authority to extend its own jurisdiction.
An extension thus requires a new treaty between the states or a corresponding authority being granted to
the regions. Of the authority which the Community already has, one says readily that the states - and the
regions as they with time strengthen their relative autonomy - practice together parts of their sovereignty
through their participation in the European Union. Independent decision making is replaced by joint decision
making. Put in different terminology, the European Union opens for manifold in the community, a horizontal
order together with a vertical one and a Europe both of and with regions. 
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But a general rule is that treaties and agreements between regions rest on safer ground when the involved
states have committed themselves. It appears that one is as unwilling to contemplate a pure Europe of
regions as one is interested in a one-dimensional Europe with regions. This is understandable if we take
European reality as our starting point. As Susan Borras-Alomar et al. write in their reflections on regional
participation in the European Union:
«Direct regional participation was necessary not only for the detailed knowledge of local conditions
which the new `programme approach´ to regional policy demanded, but also - and more importantly in
the long-term  - in the wider sense of legitimising the Brussels decision-making process which so often
is viewed as distant and bureaucratic».
Susan Borras-Alomar et al (1994: 7)
The nation-state is still the central actor in the European arena. The national state has its origin in a system
where regionalisation and the building of regions are developmental tendencies which under cut this origo.
The European Union represents not therefore just a supra-national entity, it is also represents supra-
regionality but from another perspective. It is the last mentioned which is mirrored in the way institutions in
the European Union direct their attention towards regionality and nationality.
In this article I will analyse the concept of a «regional Europe» by examining the theories that can be found
in the literature on the subject. The existing literature can be divided broadly into two types of response to
the question of a regional Europe. In an idealistic direction where the focus is upon a Europe of regions. Or
alternatively in a  more pragmatic/realistic approach where the focus is upon a Europe both of and with
regions. Between both these approaches there arise ideological differences and practical conflicts. At the
same time the post-modern dilemma is clearly mirrored when it is confronted by the strength of modernity
based upon instrumental rationality. (Habermas 1968)
Manifold community
Already in the 1950´s and 60´s the concept of regional Europe can be found in the literature. It expresses an
idealistic attitude towards the need for a regional Europe and is identified with the development of cultural
manifold, identity, civility and a post-modern Europe. (Harvey 1989)
Some, such as Leopold Kohr (1957), were sceptical to the idea of a supra-national federation and a united
Europe where questions of security and peace would be of the upmost importance. He argued that a
regional Europe was preferable because the cause of war lay principally in the concentration of power to be
found in national states. The greater the power and size of the national state, the greater the risk of conflicts
with destructive effects. Kohr interprets Europe’s political history from such a perspective and finds support
for his general belief that «small is beautiful» in a post-modern sense. He therefore visualises sub-national
entities, regions capable of preserving peace.
A perspective to be strongly opposed later was proposed by the sociologist Ralph Dahrendorf (1991), who
feared precisely just such an erosion of the national states. He asserted that in post-war Europe it was in
fact the national states after the Second World War who had guaranteed a peaceful development: involved
and regulated interaction was based upon conventions, agreements and the will to maintain a peaceful state
of affairs. In this connection, he puts regions onto the agenda by talking of «the tribes of Europe». The
reasoning is connected to Europe’s complex ethnicity, and the fact that there aren’t conventions and
agreements to regulate the relations between regions as is the case with the national states.
A second idealistic approach can be found in political philosophers such as Denis de Rougemont (1983) and
Guy Heraud (1968). Civility is seen to represent the foundation for civil society and it provides the basis for
the identity which occupies the population. Here, regionality and postmodernity are seen to play an essential
role. Denis de Rougemont´s civil orientation is mirrored in his emphasis on building up the regional
dimension as a way of re-establishing the local society; such that the  individual can find the civic dimension
without which she/he is not a real person (de Rougemont 1983)
Civility must be exercised within a concretely, existing framework. Civil actions in public arenas, devolution,
must take place within a given geographical area, which has been agreed upon in a consensual manner. To
use a turn of phrase, the large must take place in the small and the small within the large. This is obviously
what Denis de Rougemont does when he connects civility and the region together:
«...the space for civic participation in which man comes alive to the world and to himself at the same
time».
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 (de Rougemont 1983: 219)
Christopher Harvie believes that such a definition of the concept region connected to one of civility makes
both concepts unnecessarily abstract. He makes the same criticism against the sociologist Giddens: “For the
sociologist Anthony Giddens, the concept (regions of Europe) has also this fundamental quality, being a
foyer for social action extending from the family dwelling to the nation-state” (Harvie 1994: 6). Such a wide
definition of the concept region reduces its conceptual clarity, and makes it uncommonly lacking in
operationality. The concept civility becomes also unclear.
The concept civility is connected with citizens in society and their activity in social arenas. The adjective civil
means bourgeois; to go without uniform. Civility means correspondingly bourgeois activity which isn’t a result
of a given position in the established organisational and administrative system of society. Civil actions are
not a part of the bureaucracy. Civility has its basis in initiatives taken by citizens in society which lead to
actions and results. The concept reflects participation and co-operation. Sometimes in harmony with the
boundaries laid down by the establishment and in accordance with their accepted forms of action, at other
times in sharp conflict with them. For Harvey (1994) the civil society is the post-modern society which bases
itself on regionality, from the local society to regions of differing geographical size, and then further to the
national state. At issue is the manifold of community forms on different levels. But the concept civility is
connected to the public space, and not to the private sphere of the family as is the case of Giddens. Actions
are to be functional in a space where the individual and groups are able to exert control over the public
sphere. A region represents such a space. Regionality becomes indicative of a civilised society.
This means that a civilised and strong state cannot exist over time without a developed regional society.
With a lack of regionality it is only a question of time before society collapses. It was precisely this which
marked the destiny of totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and many others.
However, the western  democracies are also faced by the need to maintain regionality, and therewith civility.
Society requiring it for the dynamism and legitimacy considered necessary for stabile development.
Guy Heraud (1968) in his own way arrives at the same conclusions when it comes to sub-national units, the
regions in European development. This political author finds three possible alternative models: «A federation
of historical regions, a federation of economic regions, and a federation of ethnic regions» (Heraud 1968: 70-
78). These coincide with what I have in several texts called functional and historical/cultural regions
(Veggeland, 1992, 1994). Heraud doesn’t consider the economic region because it doesn’t give the
individual any feeling of identity, one of the main goals of building regions in Europe. He therefore draws the
conclusion that the region based on ethnicity represents the optimal political structure, and the basis of a
Europe of regions.
The theories above describe a Europe of regions in a decentralised federation where the nation-state is
abolished. The idealistic standpoint is of a manifold in community. But how practical is such a community?
How practical is the post-modern position?
Postmodernism or modernism
Post-structuralism and postmodernism with its deconstruction and refusal of the modern, is interesting for
the better understanding they provide of contemporary theories of a regional Europe and manifold in
community. The collapse of universal ideologies, utopias and logical conceptual systems, because they
don’t correspond with reality, has led postmodernists to reject them. (Flyvbjerg 1992) This is also what the
idealistic literature does when it argues for a Europe of regions. It refuses national-statism as a foundation to
build upon and connects this «ism» to modernity’s system thinking. Instead of the appeal  to «grand
narratives» one looks «the small narratives», to be found in the local and regional, with a basis in many
lifestyles, forms of life and cultures. Postmodernists argue that it is this manifold which is reality, and it
therefore forms the building blocks of the European house.
By way of contrast let us turn to modernity and its perception of the foundation of modern society.
Modernity’s starting point is the optimistic belief in rationality and enlightenment.
In the Enlightenment at the close of the eighteenth century, the European foundation for the development of
the modern society was laid as state powers were formed. They based their legitimacy upon nationalism and
a monopoly of culture. The national state’s ideological assumptions were precisely this optimistic belief in
rationality and enlightenment.
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The construction of national states
The political scientist Stein Rokkan (1987) introduces three phases in his account of the development of the
western national state over the last two centuries. The phases are at the same time placed in the context of
the development of modernity.
The first phase involves state formation. It is characterised by the consolidation of  a central political power
as it attempts to monopolise the right to use power within its own territorial boundaries. Political co-
ordination, increased centralisation, recognition of state sovereignty in relation to other powers, the
extension of state authority as it reaches across the territory with effective physical control, taxation and lines
of communication - these are typical traits associated with this phase. (Hagtvedt 1987)
The second phase involves the building of nations. Nation building for Rokkan is characterised first and
foremost by the formation of a national language and a set of cultural standards, the clarification of the
state’s conventional bonds and the motivation of the population towards action through the gradual widening
of their civil rights, “citizenship”. Nation building lays the foundation for its own political legitimacy: people’s
belief in the ruling system´s right to rule. Or, as Hagtvedt (1987: 8-9) expresses it:
«In other words, for Rokkan the building of nations is a strategy used by the central elites to
strengthen the bond between the territorial power of the state and its subjects. Such a thorough going
control of a national territory leads to a rationalisation of political authority: local identity is weakened,
and people are joined to the national community not merely by the universal right to participate, but
also by the building up of a shared cultural identity. The state belongs to the sphere of power, the
nation to the sphere of culture».
The ideology providing legitimacy is seen to be nationalism. Between central and the part-cultures of the
regions there has always been a deep conflict. this has been expressed among other things in the conflict
between a decentralised horizontal order and a centralised vertical order.
The last phase Rokkan identifies is that of class conflict. It is intimately connected with industrialisation and
the growth of social segments in the labour market and in other markets. But the lines of conflict are not one-
dimensional. They can go between national elites, over people´s identity (ideological conflicts), between
interest groups (functional  conflicts), and between the centre and the periphery (territorial conflicts)
(Hagtvedt 1987).
Preconditions for nation-state building
English philosophy, as embodied in the work of John Locke (1632-1704) in particular led to a strong belief in
reason, rationality and logical conceptual systems. A dichotomy was made between that which is and that
which ought to be. That which is, is expressed in instrumental rationalism, and this in turn provided the
foundation for the development of scientific knowledge i.e. comprehensive systems and hierarchies.
Statements with the term ought on the other hand, referred to unscientific value rationalism characterised by
a manifold of meanings and attitudes.
Instrumental rationalism’s conceptual systems were the precondition for the development of a modern
society based upon three functions:
The ideological perspective
The rationalistic conceptual system was able to function as a set of universal ideologies and utopias; these
were holistic and consistent in their perception of reality and provided the legitimation and direction for
collective actions taking place in the social arena. They were sharpened points with which to pierce
traditional and metaphysical "superstitions"; able to transform each aspect of the traditional into the modern.
National-statism is a real child of instrumental rationality, with its monopolistic ideology and suppression of
cultural minorities.
The technological perspective
The rationalistic conceptual system was able to function as a natural scientific theory, which in a totally new
way presented mankind with the chance of developing techniques and technologies to control natural forces.
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The state and its hierarchical bureaucracy were regarded as a value-free instrument giving people power
and control over the complex machinery of society. (Weber 1971)
The political perspective
The rationalistic conceptual system was able to function as a social scientific theory capable of providing the
possibility of developing a social technology, where planned action was based upon knowledge of lines of
causality. Science and rational planning were the most  important tools for developing and maintaining
modernity and the national state.
The clearest critique in this connection has been made by the social philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1968).
In particular, he identifies three social forms which are the direct consequence of the belief in the
instrumental rationality, and he believes they characterise modernity up to the present day.
To begin with the belief in rationality connected to the construction of large power and system-based
ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism, capitalism, Marxism, Communism and Nazism. These “isms”
have all been cultivated in their pure states and practised politically, with as we know, catastrophic
consequences. They were developed as products in the belief in total rationalism, but ended up as
completely irrational , both in ideology and in practice.
Secondly, they were connected with bourgeois and nationalistic demands for national state sovereignty. A
sovereignty based upon military power, power of the state, of the market and a cultural monopoly i.e. a state
top/down hegemony in all areas.
Thirdly, rationality was unequivocably connected with technical or instrumental rationality. «Technique and
science became ideology», as Habermas (1968) expressed it, an ideology legitimating in a one-dimensional
way a technological and instrumental theory capable of dominating nature and society. Rational planning
became a social activity imagining that if the causal relations were known, then reality could be manipulated
to achieve a favourable result. The state became rationalism’s highest from of political expression.
Difference
Modernity and rationality understood in this way are what postmodernism has turned against in a declaration
of the total dismissal of the modern. It lies behind the main social philosophical thesis: the collapse «of the
grand narratives»  and the rise of a manifold in community.
The thesis expresses in other words, how the large system theories, the ideologies and utopias of progress
and emancipation, creating the foundation for social, political and cultural practice within the framework of
the national state, have fallen from grace. We can add that their primary function has been to provide
legitimation for institutions: political systems reproducing inequality and lack of freedom, power for some and
impotence for others.
Instead the post-modern proposes the principle of sustainable «difference». Its position is that society
consists fundamentally of an integrating manifold, of different forms of life, cultures, forms of understanding,
language games, which can’t or shouldn’t ever be made into any uniform consensus, based on a higher
spirit to use Friedrich G. W. Hegel’s (1770-1831) terminology (see for example Lyotard, 1986; Harvey 1989).
The alternative is precisely manifold in community.
As in nature’s ecology, manifold and difference form the value and precondition for life living and regulating
itself in forms of balance. Modernity’s invasion of the socio-cultural manifold upsets inexorably the human
ecological balance, with as we are only far too aware, large local and global environmental problems
following in its wake.
Fragmentation – the post-modern dilemma
One can choose to give the critical potential a focus. In our context this will lie in the following: regionalism,
in the “small narratives”, in the power to act represented by the bottom/up perspective on conflicts of
interest. (Simonsen, 1991) The geographer and postmodernist David Harvey (1989) emphasises that the
interval between the decay of the old and the formation and establishment of the new, constitutes a period of
transition, which always necessarily will be one of uncertainty, confusion, error and wild and fierce
«fanaticism». But a number of questions remain: how will it be possible to implement the large common
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decisions which a European entity is also dependent on? How can human rights be safe-guarded? How can
greater social justice be achieved between social groups, countries and regions? How can the global eco-
systems be saved?
In opposition to the postmodernists Habermas (1981) maintains that modernity, with its rationalism, even if
incomplete, is a promising and necessary project. But it is necessary to distinguish between instrumental
and communicative rationality, between instrumental and communicative actions. Habermas asserts that it
isn’t rationality that there is something wrong with as such, but instrumental rationality’s totalising ideology
and function in practice. He doesn’t therefore reject instrumental rationality when it is directed towards the
realisation of concrete projects, and he acknowledges in principle overarching institutional systems in society
capable of ensuring collective action.
It is at this point that he inserts his critique. Technological rationality is seen to be lacking. It must be
supplemented with value rationalism and communicative actions, with enlightenment, with social
mobilisation, with dialogue - with regionality - as the way to bring about acts of an involved and emancipatory
character.
In different language, but nevertheless still relatable to  the discussion on the concept of a regional Europe,
Habermas says that planning for such a Europe is not just a project, but also a discussion of goals, joint
participation and processes. Communicative actions must therefore find their place in the manifold of
cultures, language games and forms of life making up our society (Habermas 1968). On this count he shares
a common platform with the postmodernists.
But the difference is that Habermas regards in addition modernity as a foundation for shared actions and the
carrying out of larger projects, when they are desirable. Habermas fears impotence in the postmodernist’s
theoretical position.
Irrespective of theoretical position there exists a political dilemma in the debate and it refers to questions
concerning the foundation of democracy: how is power and influence to be divided between nations, regions,
institutions, organisations and citizens? In relation to the question of a regional Europe, Habermas would
assert that a Europe of regions must be supplemented by a Europe with participating regions, where
participation by the regions in the hierarchy is based upon instrumental rationalism.
The pragmatic approach to political participation as a goal
In similar vein to Habermas’s criticism of the one-sidedness of postmodernism, there developed in the
course of the 1980s a number of analyses of the concept regional Europe, where the concern was to be
more realistic/pragmatic. The pragmatic literature suggests that the goal for regional participation is to be
found in the decision making process, access to own means to create regional development and the
formation of regional partnerships to strengthen a region´s status when based upon community and relative
autonomy.
This shift can also be seen as an answer to the large changes which have taken place in political and
economic structures. The idealistic analysis is still to be found. But the European Union system has itself
developed and created new preconditions for power and influence. Regions became involved as real
participants in both the “horizontal and vertical order” of agreements and decision making arenas. It is
possible to  say that the regions were re-created, given relative autonomy, and access to the means
necessary to develop their own territory. These events indicated that a regional Europe really was being
developed.
Susana Borras-Alomar et al. (1994: 8) write the following in  their interesting article, «Towards a Europe of
Regions? Visions and Reality from a Critical Perspective»:
«For the Commission this meant accessing regional/local expertise in the formation of Community
policies while at the same time aligning regional interest with Commission rather than national
governments or other Community institutions. For regional actors, it was a limited but important way of
beginning to respond to the overwhelming presence of national governments in the pre-proposal
stage of Commission working groups, steering and management committees - the world of
‘comitology’».
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The same authors  place an emphasis on the fact that since the 1980’s we have been witness to a European
complex developing new preconditions for the election of regional authorities as participants in the European
arena. In the same article (1994: 5) they write:
«In Western Europe political decentralisation, regional economic development and interregional co-
operation have seen an extraordinary increase during the 1980s and 1990s. These developments,
related to the intensification of European integration, have stimulated new perceptions, expectations
and political interests at subnational levels of government».
But they add that the regional influence in the European Union is still far from balanced. Reality is such that
there is substantial gap between European outputs towards the regions, and regional inputs into the
Community systems. (1994) Besides, it is not the case that all regions have the same influence and access
to the spheres of power within the European Union. There is a great difference between Catalan and the
strength of the German regions when it comes to the power game played out in the European Union, as
between North Juteland and Friesland for example.
A new understanding of the regional dimension results from the awareness cited in the quotation, where
regional activity in the European arena is seen to be increasing. It is this understanding which characterises
a more pragmatic attitude to European regionalisation and region building.
Christopher Harvie (1994) belongs to the pragmatic tradition of observers. He argues for the increased
prominence of the region as the most suitable building block for European development and points out that
taken in the more strictly political sense of the field of action of hegemonic groups, the region or the city-
region has a far longer track record than the nation. Europe was dominated for over five centuries by city-
states - the Hanse, Venice, Amsterdam - against a century and half by nation states. But his region concept
comprises also «new regions» as an expression of desentralisation of political power and of regionalised
economic development (Harvie 1994: 55-57).
Susana Borras-Alomar et al. (1994: 5) are quite explicit in their belief that a wave of pragmatism is rolling
across Europe when it comes to the role of regions.
«The pragmatic sense of the regional political elites and policy makers is based on two basic
attitudes. Firstly, there is (implicit or explicit) acceptance of the enduring nature of nationstates, rather
than questioning them. Secondly, the regional governments’ strategies vis-à-vis the new
developments of the European integration process is focused on claims about a greater institutional
presence in European Union decisions (for example, the claims about the establishment of a
Committee of the Regions in the Maastricht Treaty) and by the effective setting up of specific
initiatives such as interregional co-operation agreements and regional representation offices in
Brussels».
The pragmatic understanding of European regionalisation involves building a Europe with and of regions.
Such a conclusion has explanatory value in the degree to which the focus is upon regionalisation within the
framework of the European Union. It clarifies the concept «regional Europe», since this concept also
includes the idealistic approach interested in civility and identity, a Europe of regions. It is therefore
understandable why regional Europe is a clear concept within the pragmatic tradition.
A model for a regional Europe
The regions in Europe can be classified according to three types: (1) administrative regions, (2)
cultural/ethnic regions, and (3) functional regions. (Veggeland 1994)
The administrative regions are a part of the state hierarchy and function on the basis of what we have called
the vertical order. The administrative regions receive their juridical authority from the State, which also
decides their administrative structure and the areas over which this authority extends.
The State can delegate responsibility and rights to its administrative regions, it can also de-regulate areas in
the administrative system, but it will always retain the possibility of withdrawing this delegation if there arise
disagreements in the hierarchy. The administrative regions are in the final analysis answerable to the state.
The development of these types of regions has been closely connected to the development of the national
state, presenting the state with a way of regionalising its power and authority. Through the hierarchy the
expression of culture has been standardised, and local and regional cultural minorities have been
oppressed. (Barth  Eide and Neuman 1994)
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The cultural/ethnic regions in Europe are created by historical events. Homogeneity and the experience of
shared identity characterise citizens of these regions. They have been exposed to political and cultural
suppression by the larger society, the power of the state. But the cultural/ethnic regions have never
submitted to the national state’s attempt to standardise their culture, and, domination of their territory has
never been completely successful.
Therefore, the cultural/ethnic regions continue to exist in European space, and postmodernity with its
emphasis on «difference» has in many ways rehabilitated their existence. But, they continue to function
unequally in respect to national statism. This is not the case if they geographically more or less accidentally
coincide with the representation of an administrative region. Examples of such can be found on the
European arena. The autonomous region of Catalan can be mentioned. But such a coincidence is far from
the norm. Normally the cultural/ethnic regions reach over boundaries i.e. folk groups with a shared history
and culture live on both sides of administrative regions or national boundaries. (Hylland Eriksen 1993) They
demand a federal structure and that boundaries be dismantled, and that what we have called a «Europe of
regions» is constructed.
The functional regions are connected to an area of co-operation where a territorial regime has the
responsibility of regulation. They represent potential «economic zones of attraction». Co-operation can
involve the development of infra-structure, business enterprises, tourism, the labour market, the
environment, culture and so on. Based on such activities the functional regions don’t have to follow the
administrative boundaries, either regional or national. Inter-regional co-operation can thus take place
between administrative regions in a national state or on trans-national level. This means that administrative
boundaries don’t necessarily have to be followed, it is functional considerations which count, consideration
of such don’t usually follow such boundaries.
The functional regions can be either vertically or horizontally organised, or both. This means that co-
operation and agreements can take different forms. The vertical functional regions are limited to urban
hierarchies, city agglomerations, with one or more centres and a periphery. They can represent a labour
market, an integrated business sector, an integrated infra-structure, or an eco-system which needs to be
regulated and protected.
The horizontal regions are geographically delimited independently of place hierarchies. The horizontal order
is based on regimes which organise the activity within the region. The areas of co-operation can be the
same as for  the vertically integrated functional regions, but the centre-periphery dynamic is of less
importance. (Veggeland 1994a) What counts is the value mutually beneficial co-operation can have for the
involved territorial partners.
In contra-distinction to Guy Heraud (1968), who asserts that a model for the regions based upon functional
regions does not account for the spiritual and cultural order in Europe, an essential goal of a European
federation, I would argue the opposite. Functional regions integrate both the cultural/ethnic regions (as
Heraud argues) and the administrative regions. From a historical point of view the cultural/ethnic region is a
functional region. The same applies to the administrative region with its position in the state hierarchy. But
the functional regions would like to be regions with and of regions, and not to be hindered by the boundaries
laid down by the national state (Veggeland 1996). They wish to base themselves on both the horizontal and
vertical  order, being able to function both on an inter-state and inter-regional level. They can also function
trans-stately and trans-regionally i.e. co-operation can develop across boundaries and across the authority
of hierarchies. (Keohane 1977) This means that manifold in cultures, forms of co-operation and regimes are
able to function together.
A Europe of functional regions fits the European Union´s pragmatic interpretation of the concept regional
Europe, as it has been described above. Susan Borras-Alomar et al. (1994: 24) are correct when they
conclude with the following:
«The place of regions in Europe is alongside that of national and non-state actors. They are not, any
more, mere statistical units or the sub-ordinates of central governments, but neither are they
anywhere near to replace the state. It is this recognition that ought to guide the political discourse as
well as academic analysis away from the `Europe of the Regions´, and towards a more differentiated
appraisal of the realities of the ‘New Europe’».
A pragmatic model for a regional Europe is a Europe consisting of a manifold of and with functional regions.
Such a Europe will be «multi-perspectival», «multi-layered» and «multi-levelled». (Borras-Alomar et al. 1994:
24)
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